Researchers from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States collaborated to validate their foot and mouth disease models -AusSpread, InterSpread Plus and the North American Animal Disease Spread Model -in an effort to build confidence in their use as decision-support tools. The final stage of this project involved using the three models to simulate a number of disease outbreak scenarios, with data from the Republic of Ireland. The scenarios included an uncontrolled epidemic, and epidemics managed by combinations of stamping out and vaccination. The predicted numbers of infected premises, the duration of each epidemic, and the size of predicted outbreak areas were compared. Relative within-model between-scenario changes resulting from different control strategies or resource constraints in different scenarios were quantified and compared. Although there were differences between the models in absolute outcomes, between-scenario comparisons within each model were similar. In all three models, early use of ring vaccination resulted in the largest drop in number of infected premises compared with the standard stamping-out regimen. This consistency implies that the assumptions made by each of the three modelling teams were appropriate, which in turn serves to increase enduser confidence in predictions made by these models.
Introduction
Disease models are planning tools that can support decision-making by allowing various outbreak scenarios and control strategies to be evaluated and compared. They are useful for gaining insights into the conditions under which controversial control measures, such as emergency vaccination in a foot and mouth disease (FMD) epidemic (3), might become economically viable. Given the expense of controlling large-scale infectious disease epidemics in animal populations (15, 28) , and the short-and long-term consequences arising from decisions made in the early phase of such epidemics, decision-makers need to have confidence in the reliability of model predictions when they are to be used as a tool to inform disease control policy. Models that are verified and validated provide such confidence.
Model verification is the process that ensures that the explicit description of how disease is spread from one unit to another (provided by the subject matter expert who is responsible for designing the model) has been translated accurately into computer code (23, 27) . Validation ensures that a model provides an adequate depiction of the process it is designed to represent (24, 27) . An infectious disease model is said to be internally valid when its outputs make epidemiological sense, given the underlying population data set and the set(s) of parameters used to initiate a given scenario. External validity can only be assessed when model predictions are compared with one or more real epidemics. Validation is a difficult issue for countries with limited or no recent experience with the disease of interest, because it cannot be assumed that experience from one outbreak can be used to supply information on the behaviour of another, particularly when the inferences made may be based on limited and incomplete data from past epidemics.
Although validation and verification are acknowledged as critical steps in the model-building process, well-defined methods for validating and verifying disease models are lacking (23) . Law and Kelton (14) proposed a three-step approach:
-develop a model with high face validity, i.e. a model which, on the surface, seems reasonable to those who are knowledgeable about the system under study -test the assumptions of the model empirically -determine how representative the simulated output data are.
The first two steps lead to internal validity, whereas the third step is required to establish external validity. An additional approach for infectious disease models is to carry out what the authors term 'relative validation' (5) . Here, one or more test scenarios are defined and two or more independently developed models are used to simulate the spread of disease using each test scenario. Agreement among the participant models in terms of the numbers of premises predicted to become infected, the temporal onset of infection throughout the simulation period and (in the case of spatial models) the spatial distribution of infected premises (IPs), provides evidence that the developers of each of the models were consistent in their approach to simulating the spread of disease throughout a population of susceptible units. This consistency implies that the assumptions made by each development team make biological sense, which in turn serves to increase end-user confidence in the predictions of these models. In addition, such comparison exercises are useful in terms of identifying and highlighting differences in model assumptions that need to be resolved, thus identifying areas for further research.
In March 2005, participants from the Quadrilateral Group of countries (QUADs: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America) met in Canberra, Australia, to discuss the use of simulation models to inform policy for the control of FMD. It was agreed that a formal comparison of the models used by each country should be undertaken as a form of relative validation. The models compared were AusSpread (2, 7), InterSpread Plus (18, 26) , and the North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) (9, 25) , referred to as the Australian, New Zealand, and North American models, respectively. A three-stage programme of research was proposed. The first required each country to provide a formal description of their model. The second stage involved the comparison of outputs, from each of the models, produced by simulation of a series of relatively simple scenarios within a hypothetical study population. The results of these first two phases have been reported by Dubé and colleagues (5) . This paper reports the third stage of the model comparison exercise, which involved a series of more complex scenarios based on a real farm data set and actual livestock movement and marketing data.
Materials and methods
Data were provided by Irish colleagues who joined the research team for the third stage of the project. The data set comprised the locations of 50,125 farms located within a 90-km radius of a central point in the county of Westmeath in the Republic of Ireland. Location details for 90 livestock markets throughout the Republic of Ireland were also provided ( Fig. 1) . Each farm was characterised in terms of the type and numbers of FMD-susceptible livestock present, with eight farm enterprise types defined (Table I) .
Each of the models was parameterised to represent all major epidemiological transmission pathways for FMD Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 30 (2) frequencies of livestock movement between different farm types were derived from an extract from the Irish animal movement database for a 90-day period in late 2006. This provided details of animal movements (farm-to-farm and farm-to-market) for each of the farms included in the study data set. Movement details included the identifier of the farm initiating the movement, the date, the number and type of animals moved and the identifier of the destination farm. The identifier of the animal market involved in a movement transaction was also recorded, where appropriate. Probabilities representing how likely it was that disease would be transmitted to a destination herd, given that a movement event had taken place, were derived from published studies (12, 17) .
The movements of people, vehicles and fomites between farm enterprises were termed 'indirect movements' (in the sense that each of these vectors could carry FMD virus and indirectly infect susceptible animals at the destination location). Parameters representing the frequency of indirect movements and disease transmission probabilities were estimated for each of the eight farm types by applying relative scaling factors to the equivalent direct movement transmission values. The scaling factors were derived from an inter-farm movement survey conducted in New Zealand 529 Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 30 (2) virus, including direct and indirect transmission between farms plus local spread. A series of five scenarios was defined, with specified disease introduction conditions and various control strategies (Table II) .
Disease spread parameters
Livestock movements between different farm enterprise types were termed 'direct movements'. Parameters for (20) , from which the ratios of the frequencies of indirect to direct contact movements for relevant farm types were able to be extracted. These scaling factors were reviewed by the Irish member of the team and adjusted where necessary to reflect values that were appropriate for Irish livestock production systems.
'Local spread' is the term used to cover spread of disease over short distances (generally 5 km or less) between livestock units when there is no clear link other than geographical proximity (8, 19) . In an outbreak situation, local spread is assumed to have occurred when the investigator cannot discern any specific incident, such as the movement of animals, people, animal products or fomites, to account for disease transmission. It is a nonspecific term that covers many possibilities, and probably includes short-distance airborne spread, through-the-fence contact between animals on contiguous properties, mechanical carriage of virus by dogs, cats, birds, rodents or other wild or feral animals, and interactions between neighbours. A total of 2,160 out of the 2,365 (91%) IPs in the 1967/1968 epidemic of FMD (19) , and more than 80% of the IPs in the first four months of the 2001 epidemic of FMD (8) in the United Kingdom (UK), were attributed to local spread. Local spread is represented in all three models by a radial dissemination kernel, where probabilities of transmission to neighbouring farms vary by distance and time in relation to the date of onset of the infectious state of the source IP. The local spread probabilities used in this study were based on analyses of data from the 2001 epidemic of FMD in the UK (22) .
A set of parameters representing the likelihood of airborne spread of disease was prepared after running the Met Office (UK national weather service) NAME model (Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment [11] ) on weather observations over a four-month period in late 2006, using a virus emission profile based on a single pig infected with the Pan-Asia O1 serotype of FMD (1). These parameters were initially disabled for Scenarios 1 to 5, but subsequently Scenarios 2 to 5 were repeated with airborne transmission enabled to see if there were any differences.
Scenarios
For Scenario 1, a single farm in the centre of the study area was selected as the incursion site to allow epidemics to progress or die out under conditions of uncontrolled spread.
The initiating conditions for Scenarios 2 to 5 involved the same primary case farm as Scenario 1. The starting condition for these scenarios was the discovery of a single infected farm after a 16-day 'silent-spread' phase during which 41 farms were infected (Fig. 2) . Scenario 2 simulated implementation of the standard European Union (EU) stamping-out regimen (6), with depopulation of detected infected farms, stringent movement restrictions within a 10-km surveillance zone, and comprehensive surveillance of all at-risk farms identified through tracing of movements on and off IPs as well as those farms within a 3-km protection zone. Resource constraints were applied to depopulation and surveillance teams based on advice on response capacity provided by Irish animal health authorities.
Scenario 3 augmented the standard stamping-out policy with a contiguous cull carried out within 0.5 km around each IP. This pre-emptive slaughter used the same pool of depopulation teams as IP culling, but had a lower priority.
Scenario 4 implemented suppressive ring vaccination for 3 km around each identified IP. The decision to vaccinate was made immediately after the first detection of the infection, with a 7-day delay to allow for typing of the virus, comparison with vaccine strains, delivery of vaccine from the European Vaccine Bank and assembly of vaccination teams. Sixty teams, each with a capacity to process five herds per day, started vaccinating on the eighth day after initial detection, and the number rose to 80 and 100 teams over the next two days. Teams worked from the outside of the 3-km radial zones constructed around each IP, working progressively towards the centre and vaccinating herds that were apparently free of disease. Assuming the use of high-potency vaccines (> 6 PD 50 [protective dose or the dose of vaccine that protects 50% of the animals challenged]), immunity took 4 to 6 days to develop fully in vaccinated herds. Scenario 5 was similar to Scenario 4, except that the 'decision to vaccinate' was made on day 21 post first detection.
For each scenario, epidemics were simulated in 1-day time steps from the date of incursion for 60 days (Scenario 1) or from the date of detection to the end of the epidemic (Scenarios 2 to 5), and each simulation was repeated 40 times to generate a distribution of predictions.
Statistical analyses
For each scenario and for each model the predicted numbers of IPs and the duration of the epidemics at the end of the simulations were compared using the Kruskal-Wallis test. The sizes of the predicted outbreak areas were assessed by plotting the point locations of the IPs predicted by each of the 40 iterations of each scenario and constructing a minimum convex hull around each set of IPs. The resultant areas of these hulls were compared using the Kruskal-Wallis test.
The spatial distribution of the risk of premises becoming infected was estimated using kernel smoothing techniques. For each iteration within each scenario the log relative risk function -denoted as ρ(x) for location x -was calculated as the logarithm (to the base 2) of the ratio of estimated case to non-case farm densities. The quotient was transformed to the logarithmic scale in order to make the treatment of the individual densities symmetrical. In this application, cases were those premises in a given iteration that were predicted to become infected, and non-cases were those that were not. A fixed smoothing parameter of 9.3 km was used for all density estimations. These density estimates were corrected for boundary bias using the methods described by Kelsall and Diggle (13) .
To determine the statistical significance of 'peaks' in the risk functions (which correspond to a heightened risk of infection), the asymptotic method for fixedbandwidth kernel-smoothed risk functions described by Hazelton and Davies (10) was employed. This approach assumes a null hypothesis (H 0 ) of the uniformity of a given risk function, H 0 : ρ(x) = 0. Given that significantly heightened risk 'hotspots' were being tested for, our alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) took the form H 1 : ρ(x) > 0. The p-values describing the strength of evidence against H 0 were calculated using the Hazelton-Davies method for each location x. These p-value surfaces were then averaged over the study region for each of the sets of 40 iterations, allowing tolerance contours (at a significance level of 0.05) to be specific to each scenario for each of the three models. This analysis was performed using the statistical software R (16), with the contributed package sparr ('spatial relative risk') (4).
Results
Descriptive statistics of the predictions for Scenarios 2 to 5 are shown in Table III (number of IPs), Table IV (epidemic duration) and Table V (size of outbreak area). Also shown are the test statistics and the p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis tests for significant differences in the predictions made by the different models, for each scenario. Figure 3 shows the predicted number of IPs expressed relative to the minimum number of IPs across all scenarios, for each model and for each scenario. Figure 4 shows the same comparison for duration of the epidemics, and Figure 5 shows the same comparison for predicted outbreak areas.
Repeating Scenarios 2 to 5 with airborne transmission enabled made no significant difference to the results, and therefore these results are not presented.
Changes to the specifications of each scenario produced biologically plausible changes in the outcomes of interest. Standard EU controls (Scenario 2) applied after a 16-day silent-spread phase resulted in epidemics ranging in size from 56 to 584 IPs (Table III, Fig. 3 The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that for each of the four control scenarios the number of IPs predicted differed among the models, and these differences were unlikely to have occurred by chance. The North American model consistently predicted larger epidemics, (Table IV) .
In terms of the predicted outbreak areas for each scenario, there were no significant differences among the three models ( Figure 6 shows contour plots delineating areas where the risk of a farm being a case was predicted to be beyond that expected by chance (p < 0.05). The locations of the highrisk areas predicted by each model for Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 were similar. A smaller, high-risk focus of infection to the north-west of the first IPs was predicted by two of the models in Scenarios 3 and 5 (Figs 6b and 6d, respectively) , and by all three models in Scenario 4 (Fig. 6c) . The highrisk area predicted by the Australian model in Scenario 2 was larger than that predicted by both the North American and the New Zealand models (Fig. 6a) .
Discussion
The prerequisites for building and deploying models of infectious disease spread include a clearly defined set of objectives. The work ideally involves a multi-disciplinary team including veterinarians, modellers, economists, statisticians, computer programmers and policy advisers. Baseline data are required detailing the following:
-the locations of farms and markets in the country or region of interest -a good understanding of between-farm movement patterns of livestock, animal products and other potential risk conveyors (which may require animal traceability databases and/or field research)
-epidemiological knowledge of the disease being modelled, based on literature reviews, analyses of past outbreaks, expert elicitation, experimental studies and computerised epidemic management systems that can be used to extract relevant parameters in real time during actual disease outbreaks.
Finally, once a model has been developed, it needs to be subjected to a process of verification and validation. This study documents the efforts of three independent modelling groups to address this requirement.
The first paper in this series (5) presented the results of a relative validation exercise for the Australian, North American and New Zealand models using a hypothetical data set and a series of simple scenarios. In the study reported in this paper, the relative validation process has been extended to use actual population data and realistic outbreak scenarios. The findings presented here represent additional steps to increase end-user confidence in infectious disease model predictions.
Similar to the validation exercise that used hypothetical data (5), the process of developing parameters for each of the five scenarios described in this study provided the opportunity for each of the modelling teams to take an indepth look at the way core functions were implemented in their models. There were a number of challenges that emerged as this phase of the project progressed. The first of these was agreeing on the set of enterprise types present in the raw data on farms and animal movements from the Republic of Ireland (Table I ). In the absence of a standardised farm type classification, farms were differentiated on the basis of the counts of animals present on each premises by livestock class, and on the relative frequencies with which different livestock classes were sold or moved off the premises. These definitions were important as they allowed the models to incorporate relatively fine-scale heterogeneities in the spatial data and to make use of contact rates specific to different farm types. The latter were subsequently derived from the animal movement database once the definitions had been agreed upon. The second set of challenges related to the details of the implementation of each of the control measures, which were in turn dependent on a thorough understanding of the epidemiology of the disease. For instance, to model vaccination, realistic time-dependent parameters had to be defined for issues such as:
-how far into the control programme the decision to vaccinate would be made -how long it would take to obtain stocks of vaccine and assemble the vaccination teams -how many herds could be vaccinated per day given the available resources -how long it would take for immunity to develop within a herd (i.e. the rate of progressive reduction in susceptibility to FMD infection at a herd level)
-how long vaccine-induced immunity would persist.
Given that the models were all stochastic systems, many of these parameters had to be specified using parametric frequency distributions. Literature reviews on the epidemiology of FMD, and expert opinion, particularly from the Irish member of the team, allowed realistic resource requirements to be simulated.
There were some statistically significant differences (between models within scenarios) in the number of IPs, epidemic duration and the spatial distribution of IPs predicted by the three models in each of the scenarios. Generally, the Australian and New Zealand models produced similar-sized epidemics, whereas the North American model tended to produce larger epidemics. Some differences in IP numbers could be explained by programming decisions that were made when the models were first developed. For instance, in the Australian and New Zealand models, infected but not yet detected (and hence not yet quarantined) farms could still send animals to detected IPs, although they had no effect on the recipient farm' s disease status. In contrast, the North American model always selected non-detected farms to receive movements, increasing the likelihood of disease transmission to uninfected farms and producing larger outbreaks (Table III and Fig. 3) . Further, the way in which the underlying spatial searching routines were implemented when selecting a farm to act as the destination for a movement event varied among the models, and no doubt this contributed to some of the differences in the size of predicted outbreak areas (Table V , Fig. 5 ) and the location of high-risk areas (Fig. 6) . Differences in the spatial extent of the simulated epidemics were expected, because the process of selecting direct and indirect contact farms for each source farm involved generating directions and distances randomly from the prescribed probability distributions for each scenario.
Simulating Scenarios 2 to 5 with and without airborne transmission enabled made no appreciable difference to the number of IPs or duration of the epidemic. Detailed investigations of the farms infected in these scenarios showed very few infected pig farms, and therefore there was little opportunity for airborne transmission to play a role. Furthermore, it is known that the Pan-Asia O1 FMD virus represented by our set of transmission parameters is excreted in lower quantities and is less infectious to exposed livestock than the O type involved during the 1967/1968 FMD epidemic in the UK (1, 21) .
Despite the significant differences in the absolute number of IPs generated by the different models in each of the scenarios, relative within-model between-scenario changes resulting from the application of different control strategies showed consistent patterns (Figs 3 to 5), although not all of these effects were significant. The lack of significance in the New Zealand results may have been due to the fact that the epidemics were only modest in size. Scenarios 2 to 5 all started with the same initial conditions, with 41 infected IPs. Therefore, there were only relatively modest numbers of new IPs generated within which to produce statistically different results for the various control strategies. Nevertheless, any advice provided to decision-makers about the relative merits of different control strategy options would have been similar among the models. For instance, early implementation of ring vaccination (Scenario 4) resulted in the largest decrease in IP numbers for all three models, when compared to the standard EUapproved stamping-out regimen (Scenario 2). This finding was immensely encouraging, and is consistent with the view that disease models of this type cannot predict (or be expected to predict) epidemic sizes precisely, but that they have a role to play by demonstrating the relative effects of various mitigation strategies in both endemic and diseasefree situations.
Other potential roles for these models include:
-exploring how quickly a disease might spread should it be introduced into a country or region previously free of disease -comparing and evaluating different surveillance strategies for early detection of disease -informing economic studies such as a benefit-cost analysis of an eradication programme -evaluating resource requirements for response options -gaining new insights into the epidemiology of the disease, including highlighting areas for further research.
In conclusion, the study confirmed that there is merit in international collaboration for building and deploying these types of model. The ability to compare results when using identical input data and to explore reasons for any differences was invaluable in interpreting and gaining confidence in the model outputs. The study highlighted the challenges inherent in obtaining suitable data to adequately parameterise disease simulation models. It also reinforced the need for countries to understand what data are required, and to undertake research to gather the necessary information or deploy systems that can be queried on demand to provide the relevant details. 'un scénario à l'autre en fonction des différentes stratégies de lutte mises en oeuvre, mais aussi en fonction des contraintes de ressources envisagées dans chaque scénario. En termes de résultats absolus, des différences nettes ont été constatées entre les modèles ; en revanche, d'un modèle à l'autre, les comparaisons entre les différents scénarios se sont révélées similaires. Les trois modèles ont annoncé que l'utilisation précoce de la vaccination en anneau permettait de réduire le nombre d'exploitations infectées de manière bien plus efficace que la méthode habituelle d'abattage sanitaire. Ces résultats ont confirmé la justesse des hypothèses avancées par les trois équipes de modélisation, ce qui permet de renforcer la confiance de l'utilisateur final dans les prédictions obtenues par ces modèles. Enfermedades Animales) con el objetivo de generar confianza en el uso de esos modelos como herramientas de apoyo a la adopción de decisiones. La fase final consistía en utilizar los tres modelos para simular varias situaciones hipotéticas de brote infeccioso, con datos tomados de la República de Irlanda. Las hipótesis eran la de una epidemia fuera de control y la de epidemias gestionadas con una combinación de medidas de sacrificio sanitario y vacunación. Se compararon las predicciones de los modelos en cuanto a número de explotaciones infectadas, duración de cada epidemia y área de extensión del brote, y se cuantificaron y compararon los cambios relativos entre los resultados que un mismo modelo arrojaba para cada hipótesis al aplicar distintas estrategias de control o limitar los recursos disponibles en cada situación. Aunque se observaron diferencias entre los resultados de los modelos en valores absolutos, la comparación entre distintas hipótesis, al aplicar un mismo modelo, arrojó resultados similares en los tres casos. En todos ellos la rápida aplicación de vacunaciones perifocales se traducía en el descenso más pronunciado del número de explotaciones infectadas en comparación con el régimen habitual de sacrificios sanitarios. De ahí se infiere que las premisas de partida de los tres equipos de modelizadores eran correctas, lo que infunde al usuario final más confianza en las predicciones obtenidas con los tres modelos.
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